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OPENING REMARKS
The Tightening Circle of Membership*
By T. ALEXANDER

ALEINIKOFF**

In a justly celebrated essay entitled the "Transformation of the
Statue of Liberty," historian John Higham elaborates on a little
known fact: that Emma Lazarus' famous tribute to "A mighty woman
with a torch"-a "Mother of Exiles"-went virtually unnoticed when
composed in 1883 (Lazarus died in 1887). It was not inscribed on the
interior wall of the Statue's pedestal until 1903; and, in Higham's
words, "the poem rested there for another thirty years without attracting any publicity at all."1
The Statue, as all schoolchildren know, was the inspiration of a
French sculptor, Frederic Auguste Bartholdi, and a gift from the
French people, symbolizing the friendship of the two republics. It was
to have been an exhibit at the Philadelphia Exposition of 1876, marking the centennial of American independence, but only the arm and
the torch were completed by that time. At the inaugural ceremonies,
the theme of immigration received no mention. Rather, again in
Higham's words, "President Grover Cleveland discoursed grandiloquently on the stream of light that would radiate outward into 'the
darkness and ignorance and man's oppression until Liberty enlightens
the world.'

. .

. The rhetoric.., concentrated almost exclusively on

two subjects: the beneficent effect on other countries of American
ideas, and the desirability of international friendship and peace." 2
The torch that at first represented shining American ideals that
would light the world, of course, eventually took on the gloss of the
Lazarus poem-as a beacon of welcome, lighting the way to a free and
* This is a transcription of the opening remarks given at the Hastings Constitutional
Law Quarterly's Symposium, Does the Door Close?: ConstitutionalProblems in State and
FederalImmigration Law (April 1, 1995).
** Executive Associate Commissioner, Immigration and Naturalization Service, U.S.
Department of Justice.
1. JoHN HIGHAM, SEND TEmSE TO ME 81 (1975).

2. Id.
[915]
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democratic land. But this transformation occurred much later; indeed, after the great migrations of the early part of the century had
ceased. By the 1930s, America could begin to recognize "the contributions of the newer ethnic groups," to celebrate its multicultural origins and attributes.3 By then, the sons and daughters of the
immigrants of earlier years were Americans-speaking English, graduating from institutions of higher learning, voting. During the 1940s,
Higham reports, "the words of the poem became a familiar litany in
mass circulation magazines, children's stories, and high-school history
texts."4 And in 1945, the tablet on which it had been inscribed in 1903
was moved to the main entrance of the Statue. Higham concludes:
"Because few Americans now were immigrants, all could think of
themselves as having been immigrants ....

[T]he new meaning en-

grafted on the Statue of Liberty in the second quarter of the twentieth
century worked to close the rift that mass immigration had opened in
American society." 5
What I would like to ruminate upon today is whether the meaning of the Statue is again undergoing transformation-and whether
that new meaning is widening rather than closing the new rift that the
new mass immigration to the U.S. has opened in our day. I start with
the front page of the DetroitFree Press on election day 1992. Covering the entire page was a large cartoon of the Statue of Liberty, with
the heading (and here I rely on memory): "If you do not vote today,
she stands for nothing." This is hardly a message about immigrants; it
is, in fact, a statement about citizenship. Putting to the side for a moment current legislative proposals to cut legal immigrants off from
federal benefits, the franchise remains the single most important distinction between the status of lawful permanent resident and citizen.
The editors of the Free Press were equating the Statue not with the
welcome of new arrivals, but rather with the community of alreadyarrived full members (citizens): If you (citizens) do not vote today,
she (a symbol of liberty, democracy-liberal democracy) means nothing. It is not obvious to me why the Statue was used in this manner.
Interestingly, a Canadian law professor has suggested to me that it
echoes the use of a replica of the Statue by Chinese students martyred
in their protests for democracy in Tienanmen Square.
For the Statue to take on this new meaning-a celebration of citizenship-does, to some extent, return it to its roots. The political lib3. Id at 85.
4. Id
5. Id at 87.
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erty it initially memorialized-the liberty of the American and French
revolutions-was freedom from monarchy and subjecthood, the establishment of the equal democratic liberty of "citoyen." And, of course,
there is a natural link between immigrants and citizens. A Statue symbolizing citizenship may also celebrate immigration as the welcoming
of persons intent on becoming citizens. It may lead us to put great
efforts into naturalization, to encourage all here to become full
members.
But today I see a darker side of the emphasis on citizenship-a
circling of the wagons more than a invitation to climb on board.
This is a new we/theyness. Think back on academic scholarship
on immigration over the past decade or so. In earlier years, academics
suggested that the line between legal and illegal immigrants was artificial in that it failed to recognize the invitation the U.S. had historically
extended-at least de facto-to undocumented workers and that it
did not appreciate the rather full integration of "illegal" aliens into
American society.6 To these scholars-to many of us-"illegal" was a

status, a name, a designation by the law that did not mirror the social
reality. The legalization programs of the 1986 immigration legislation
explicitly sought to resolve the tension between the legal categories
and social reality; and Plyler v. Doe7 represented the (somewhat startling) judicial declaration of a constitutional effacing of the line between "legal" and "illegal."
But times have changed. Although perhaps four million aliens in
unlawful status reside in the U.S., there is no mood to legalize any
portion of them. Proposition 187 could not be clearer in its declaration of non-membership; the Governor and electorate of California
have demanded reconsideration of Plyler.
So liberals have retreated a bit, choosing a smaller concentric circle: illegals are outside, but legal immigrants and citizens are inside.
In words that few would have predicted a year or two ago, immigrant
and ethnic advocacy groups are recognizing that enforcement of the
border is a legitimate and significant public policy goal. For these
groups, perhaps, the idea is that emphasis on border control might
lessen concern about interior enforcement. But my guess is that this
strategy won't work. While there will continue to be criticism of em6. See, e.g., Linda S. Bosniak, Exclusion and Membership: The Dual Identity of the
Undocumented Worker Under United States Law, 1988 Wis. L. REv. 955 (1988); Gerald P.
Lopez, Undocumented Mexican Migration: In Search of a Just Immigration Law and Policy, 28 UCLA L. REv. 615 (1981).
7. 457 U.S. 202 (1982).
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ployer sanctions on the ground that they increase discrimination
against "foreign-looking" U.S. citizens and lawful immigrants, I think
that there is a growing consensus that enforcement of employer sanctions must be stepped up and that state-of-the-art verification systems
must be developed and deployed to ensure that illegal aliens already
in the U.S. receive neither jobs nor benefits. So too there will be a
serious effort at removal of aliens unlawfully here; so long as civil liberties are respected, I don't think there will be much objection.
Will the illegal/legal line hold? Here I return to my opening comments on the Statue of Liberty. There is increasing evidence that yet a
smaller circle is taking on primary salience: that of citizen.
As a constitutional matter, we are presented with differing views
of the importance of the concept of citizenship in our fundamental
law. Alexander Bickel (himself a refugee) opined that "[r]emarkably
enough.., the concept of citizenship plays only the most minimal role
in the American constitutional scheme."8' He finds this a happy fact:
"A relationship between government and the governed that turns on
citizenship can always be dissolved or denied.... It has always been
easier, it always will be easier, to think of someone as a noncitizen
than to decide that he is a nonperson." 9 Chief Justice Rehnquist, on
the other hand, has concluded that "the Constitution... recognizes a
basic difference between citizens and aliens," finding that "[t]hat distinction is constitutionally important in no less than 11 instances in a
political document noted for its brevity."'1 Most noteworthy for
Rehnquist is the fact that the Fourteenth Amendment specifically defines citizenship; in placing a definition in the Constitution, Rehnquist
argues, "Congress obviously thought it was doing something, and
something important. Citizenship meant something, a status in and
relationship with a society which is continuing and more basic than
mere presence or residence."'"
Our constitutional tradition pays homage to both views. It is well
established that aliens in the U.S. possess virtually all the constitutional rights with which citizens are endowed. Yet it has never been
doubted that, for some purposes, states and the federal government
8.

ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE MORALITY OF CONSENT 33 (1975).
9. Id.at 53.
10. Sugarman v. Dougall, 413 U.S. 634, 651 (1973) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
11. Id. at 652. In United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259 (1990) (plurality
opinion), Chief Justice Rehnquist shows ambivalence by stating that the Fourth Amendment only applies to "the people" of the United States, which he construes as "a class of
persons who are part of a national community or who have otherwise developed sufficient
connection with this country to be considered part of that community." Id. at 265.

Summer 19951

TIGHTENING CIRCLE OF MEMBERSHIP

may distinguish citizens and aliens. 2 It is clearly constitutional, for
example, to require that voters, jurors, and candidates for high office
be U.S. citizens. And the Supreme Court has upheld state laws imposing citizenship requirements for occupations it concludes involve exercises of sovereign power: teachers,' 3 police officers,1 4 and probation
officers. 15
For years, Congress has taken Bickel's approach when defining
eligibility for most federal benefits and opportunities.16 That is, permanent resident aliens and citizens have been treated alike. The
Supreme Court has applied
similar rules under the Fourteenth
7
Amendment to the States.'
The welfare reform package adopted this month by the House of
Representatives represents a dramatic shift in national policy. Under
the legislation, lawful permanent residents are fully excluded from
five major "safety net" entitlement programs-cash assistance, food
stamps, supplemental security income, medicaid, and social services
under title XX of the Social Security Act-whether or not they had
previously worked in the U.S. and paid taxes. There are some exceptions, for immigrants over 75, veterans and their immediate relatives;
but for the vast majority of permanent resident aliens, the bar will last
until citizenship. According to its sponsors, the exclusion of immigrants from these programs will save over $20 billion a year.
What justifications are offered in support of this rending of the
safety net? One justification might be the need to save funds in order
to pay for other parts of welfare reform (or for tax cuts). Is this a
permissible justification?
Under general principles of constitutional law, a class of persons
may not be carved out from protection or specially burdened without
a rational basis. When the burdened group is one that cannot protect
itself in the political process, it might be argued that a more substantial justification is required.' 8 Thus, the simple desire to save money
12. T. Alexander Aleinikoff, FederalRegulation ofAliens and the Constitution, 83 AM.
J. INr'L L. 862 (1989).
13. Ambach v. Norwick, 441 U.S. 68 (1979).
14. Foley v. Connelie, 435 U.S. 291 (1978).
15. Cabell v. Chavez-Salido, 454 U.S. 432 (1982).
16. The one significant exception is eligibility for the federal civil service.
17. See, e.g., Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365 (1971) (welfare); Sugarman v. Dougall, 413 U.S. 634 (1973) (state civil service); Nyquist v. Mauclet, 432 U.S. 1 (1977) (higher
education financial assistance).
18. Gerald M. Rosberg, The ProtectionofAliens from Discriminatory Treatmentby the
National Government, 1977 Sup. Or. REv. 275, 289-90; JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY
AND DISRusT" A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW 148 (1980).
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cannot be an adequate justification for the exclusion of permanent
resident aliens-either in constitutional or public policy terms. 19
A more tenable justification would be to link the bar to exercise
of the federal immigration power: Congress has the power to determine classes of admissible aliens; and for many years, aliens who are
"likely to become a public charge" have been excludable. From this
perspective, the ban on benefits can be viewed as enforcement of the
public charge exclusion ground. During the floor debate, Congressman Roukema expressed it this way:
While the exclusion for legal aliens has received quite a bit of
criticism, I want to make sure that everyone realizes an oftenoverlooked, but essential component of our immigration laws.
For decades, our immigration laws have required immigrants to
stipulate that they will be self-sufficient once they arrive in
America, as a condition of their being allowed to immigrate in
the first place. Consequently, receiving welfare has been
grounds for deportation for these very same immigrants for
generations.2 °
This is not quite right. The deportation ground for welfare usage
mandates removal of an alien who "within five years after the date of
entry, has become a public charge from causes not affirmatively shown
to have arisen since entry."'" That is, the deportation ground enforces
the exclusion ground. Importantly, it does not provide that any immigrant who goes on welfare is deportable. This is consistent with a view
of immigrants as "members-becoming," recognizing that they, like
citizens, may fall on hard times and need assistance.
These considerations lead me to conclude that the actual justification for the exclusion of immigrants from major entitlement programs
turns on a narrowing conception of membership. In the words of
Congressman Riggs, "the message that we are sending here, and we
are clearly stating to our fellow citizens, [is] that we really are going to
put the rights and needs of American citizens first."'
Of course, the needs of American citizens come first. But does
that necessarily mean that the needs of lawful permanent residents
should count not at all? The problem with drawing a hard and fast
legal immigrant/citizen line is that the transition from immigrant to
citizen is a process, a maturation, an evolution-not an on/off switch.
19. Cf. U.S.D.A. v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528 (1973).
20. 141 Cong. Rec. H3374 (1995).
21. Immigration and Nationality Act § 241(a)(5), 8 U.S.C. § 1251(a)(5) (1988 & Supp.
V 1993) (emphasis added).
22. 141 Cong. Rec. H3412 (1995).
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Many immigrants live in families with, and support, U.S. citizens. The
majority of immigrants seek and attain citizenship. The vast majority
of adult immigrants are gainfully employed, paying taxes to support
the benefit programs. Immigrants, to my mind, are appropriately
characterized not as outsiders or non-members, but as "citizens-intraining." Heretofore, public policy has generally viewed immigrants
this way,23 recognizing that citizenship-building is a sound
investment.24
With this perspective in mind, I would suggest another approach
to the benefits issue-one proposed by the minority in the House and
supported by the Administration-that offers a more direct link to the
public charge exclusion ground. As you know, an intending immigrant can overcome the public charge test by demonstrating either
that he or she has a job in the U.S. (and is therefore self-supporting)
or by submitting an affidavit of support from a U.S. sponsor. The
problem has been that courts have found the affidavits of support unenforceable. The minority proposal had two aspects: to make the affidavits of support judicially enforceable and to deem the sponsor's
income to an immigrant who applies for needs-based benefits. Unlike
the full-scale cut-off, these provisions are more carefully tailored to
the manner by which an alien seeks to overcome the public charge
exclusion, and they avoid sending the binary message (citizens 1, legal
immigrants 0) of the House-passed measure.
To be troubled by a hardening of the legal immigrant/citizen line
may lead us not only to resist new measures but also to give closer
scrutiny to lines existing in our current law. I am thinking about the
different treatment afforded citizens and permanent resident aliens
under the preference system. As you all know, immediate relatives of
U.S. citizens (parents, minor unmarried children, and spouses) are not
subject to a numerical quota, and therefore immigrate to the U.S. in
relatively short order. Spouses and minor children of permanent resident aliens (who were not related at time of the permanent resident's
entry), however, are subject to the numerical limits of the second preference. Parents of permanent residents are not covered by any entry
23. Ugly, glaring counterexamples were laws prohibiting Chinese and Japanese frgm
naturalizing.
24. See ROBERTO SURO, REMEMBERING THE AMERICAN DREAM: HISPANIC IMMIGRATION AND NATIONAL POLICY 112 (1994) (describing policies of "integration": "Immi-

gration should be viewed as an enterprise in which both the immigrant and the host nation
bring certain assets to the table and both have an interest in seeing that the enterprise
succeeds. Both sides must make investments in each other, and both take risks on the
assumption that they will each draw returns" id.).
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category; they may join a child living in the U.S. only after the child
naturalizes. To see the difference consider two unmarried adultsFred, a citizen at birth, and Lazlo, a permanent resident alien who
came to the U.S. two years ago. Now suppose that both spend some
time overseas, fall in love and marry a non-U.S. citizen. Not surprisingly, Fred and Lazlo choose to petition for their spouse's entry to the
U.S. Fred's spouse will be granted permission to enter in a year or
less; Lazlo will wait for four to five years.
What sustains this distinction, arguably trenching on a fundamental constitutional interest protecting family? Perhaps the thinking is
that we are more sure that Fred is likely to be with us for the long
haul, but Lazlo-just as he has once changed his permanent residence-might decide to leave. Or maybe we recognize that "unification" can occur over there as well as here, and that Lazlo would face
less of a hardship than Fred in moving to where his spouse currently
resides. Or perhaps the distinction is intended to provide an incentive
to naturalization.
The rather straightforward answers to these possible justifications
should be apparent, and I will not run through them here. The underlying theme to all is that the classification is woefully under- and overinclusive, true for some but not all citizens and some but not all aliens.
But there is one justification that fits perfectly-the same one
that seems to be at work in the benefits debate. It is the argument
that we may, plain and simple, favor citizens over permanent resident
aliens.
While the justifications suggested are probably strong enough to
withstand the toothless constitutional scrutiny afforded regulations of
immigration,2 5 Congress is free to go beyond the constitutional minimum. It may soon consider doing so: the Commission on Immigration Reform will issue a report this summer on legal immigration, and
Senator Simpson has declared that he will introduce legislation on the
matter this session.
I would think that a good case can be made for treating citizens
and permanent resident aliens more alike in this regard. The interest
26
here-living with close family members-is undeniably substantial.
Furthermore, as is frequently noted, permanent resident aliens pay
taxes and are liable to military service to the same degree as citizens.
25. See Aleinikoff, supra note 12; Stephen H. Legomsky, Immigration Law and the
Principleof Plenary CongressionalPower, 1984 Sup. Cr. REv. 255.
26. See John Guendelsberger, Implementing Family Unification Rights in American
Immigration Law: Proposed Amendments, 25 SAN DIEGO L. REv. 253 (1988).
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An obvious argument against a change in policy is the numbers.
More than one million aliens are on the 2-A waiting list. To make all
these numbers, in effect, current would swell immigration at a time
when the political winds seem to be blowing strongly in the opposite
direction. An answer here would be to take numbers from elsewhere-either reducing or eliminating the "diversity" category or
crafting the INA to reflect a tighter definition of immediate family by
allocating fourth preference numbers to the second preference.27 Or
perhaps equality could be established over time by slowing increasing
admissions until the backlog is cleared.
No doubt there are other proposals to consider here, and I am
not recommending-at this point-a particular choice. What I am
suggesting is that we should examine more closely what I believe to be
the underlying rationale for disparate treatment: the permanent resident/citizen line.
Conclusion
Are we moving toward the smaller concentric circle? Consider
the words of Justice White in the 1982 case of Cabell v. ChavezSalido,2 8 which upheld a citizenship requirement for the job of probation officer:
The exclusion of aliens from basic governmental processes
is not a deficiency... but a necessary consequence of the community's process of political self-definition. Self-government,
whether direct or through representatives, begins by defining
the scope of the community of the governed and thus of the
governors as well: Aliens are by definition those outside of this
community.29
This seems plainly wrong. Resident aliens are not outside the scope of
the community of the governed; and they have, as I have mentioned,
well-established constitutional rights. But Justice White's language
appears to realize Bickel's worst fears: exclusion by definition.
Without sounding too alarmist, let me suggest that the immigrant/
citizen distinction may not be the final resting place in the definition
of membership. Suppose that Congress determines that legislation
cutting off benefits to immigrants has produced a rush to naturalization and further suppose (1) that this effect means that the requisite
dollar savings do not accrue, and (2) that members of Congress con27. Unused visa allocations for employment-based immigrants already rollover to the
family-based categories the following year.
28. 454 U.S. 432 (1982).
29. Id at 439-40.
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clude that the desire to get on the dole is not an appropriate motivation for becoming a U.S. citizen. Is it not conceivable that legislation
would be introduced distinguishing naturalized citizens from nativeborn citizens for purposes of eligibility for federal benefits? 30 Might
not some be inclined to make a naturalized citizen's immediate receipt
of federal benefits grounds for denaturalization?
We have been proudest of our political history when it has been
inclusive: the Fourteenth Amendment rectified the deplorable exclusivity of the Dred Scott opinion; the 1965 Immigration Act (belatedly)
removed the ignominious National Origin Quota system-eliminating
such ugly phrases as "the Asian Barred Zone"; the 1990 Immigration
Act deleted outdated cold-war exclusion grounds.
As we pursue the crucial task of restoring credibility to our immigration enforcement efforts-to saying a firm no to illegal immigration-let us continue to celebrate legal immigration. Let us not
redefine the Statue of Liberty by narrowing the circle of "we." Let it
remain an inclusive symbol, extending to the newest Americans-citizens-in-training-an invitation to join in our experiment in
democracy.

30. Cf Immigration Reform and Control Act § 201(h), 8 U.S.C. § 1255a(h) (1988 &
Supp. V 1993) (disqualifying legalized aliens from most federal benefits for five years, despite the fact that most would be permanent resident aliens for much of that time period).

